

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange and the Discrete Log Problem

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Number Theory

Introduction

Suppose two individuals, Eliza (E) and Zoey (Z), want to communicate using a classical (non-public-key) cryptosystem, but they must share their key via insecure (unencrypted) means.

In the presence of eavesdroppers, is there any way E and Z can securely agree upon a secret key (without using encryption)?

The *Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* provides one way to accomplish this.

Its security is based on the difficulty in solving the *discrete log problem*.

The Set-up

E and Z do the following:

- (publicly) agree on a prime p and a generator g of $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^\times$;
- E secretly chooses an integer $1 \leq m \leq p - 1$; she (publicly) transmits g^m to Z;
- Z secretly chooses an integer $1 \leq n \leq p - 1$; she (publicly) transmits g^n to E;
- compute $g^{mn} = (g^n)^m = (g^m)^n$ and agree to use it as their secret key.

Example

Suppose E and Z have agreed on $p = 5754853343$ and $g = 5 + p\mathbb{Z}$.

E has chosen $m = 581869302$ and used repeated squaring to compute

$$g^m = 5^{581869302} + p\mathbb{Z} = 4434769206 + p\mathbb{Z},$$

which she sends to Z.

Z has chosen $n = 3586334585$ and used repeated squaring to compute

$$g^n = 5^{3586334585} + p\mathbb{Z} = 1689959166 + p\mathbb{Z},$$

which she sends to E.

Because she knows m , E can use Z 's message to compute g^{mn} :

$$\begin{aligned}g^{mn} &= (g^n)^m \\&= (1689959166 + p\mathbb{Z})^m \\&= 1689959166^{581869302} + p\mathbb{Z} \\&= 2372777492 + p\mathbb{Z}.\end{aligned}$$

Likewise, Z can compute g^{mn} from n and E's message:

$$\begin{aligned}g^{mn} &= (g^m)^n \\&= (4434769206 + p\mathbb{Z})^n \\&= 4434769206^{3586334585} + p\mathbb{Z} \\&= 2372777492 + p\mathbb{Z}.\end{aligned}$$

So their “shared secret” is $2372777492 + p\mathbb{Z}$.

Security

The quantities p, g, g^m, g^n are public knowledge.

To determine the secret key g^{mn} an eavesdropper must determine either m or n .


That is, the eavesdropper must solve

The Discrete Log Problem. Given a cyclic group $G = \langle g \rangle$ and $a \in G$, find an $n \in \mathbb{Z}$ so that $g^n = a$.

For $G = (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^\times$ this is a “very difficult” problem to solve, as the following graph illustrates.

Log plot

Plot of the discrete logarithm $n = \log_g a$ (i.e. $g^n = a$) for $G = (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^\times$, $p = 257$ and $g = 3 + p\mathbb{Z}$.



Remarks

Because of its random behavior, $\log_g a$ is “hard” to compute.

A naïve way to find $\log_g a$ is to simply compute

$$g, g^2, g^3, g^4, \dots$$

until one lands on a .

Based on the “random” behavior we have seen, this is extremely inefficient.

However, there is no known algorithm that is more efficient than this approach.

In the “toy” example above ($p = 5754853343$, $g = 5 + p\mathbb{Z}$, $a = 4434769206 + p\mathbb{Z}$) this process took nearly 17 minutes on a 2.53 GHz processor to compute m .